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Information Flow in Social Groups
Fang Wu, Bernardo A. Huberman, Lada A. Adamic and Joshua R. Tyler
Information Dynamics Lab, HP Laboratories, 1501 Page Mill Road, CA 94304-1126
We present a study of information flow that takes into account the observation that an item
relevant to one person is more likely to be of interest to individuals in the same social circle than
those outside of it. This is due to the fact that the similarity of node attributes in social networks
decreases as a function of the graph distance. An epidemic model on a scale-free network with
this property has a finite threshold, implying that the spread of information is limited. We tested
our predictions by measuring the spread of messages in an organization and also by numerical
experiments that take into consideration the organizational distance among individuals.
The problem of information flows in social organiza-
tions is relevant to issues of productivity, innovation and
the sorting out of useful ideas out of the general chatter
of a community. How information spreads determines
the speed with which individuals can act and plan their
future activities. In particular, email has become the pre-
dominant means of communication in the information so-
ciety. It pervades business, social and scientific exchanges
and as such it is a highly relevant area for research on
communities and social networks. Not surprisingly, email
has been established as an indicator of collaboration and
knowledge exchange [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Email is also a good
medium for research because it provides plentiful data on
personal communication in an electronic form.
Since individuals tend to organize both formally and
informally into groups based on their common activities
and interests, the way information spreads is affected by
the topology of the interaction network, not unlike the
spread of a disease among individuals. Thus one would
expect that epidemic models on graphs are relevant to
the study of information flow in organizations. In par-
ticular, recent work on epidemic propagation on scale
free networks found that the threshold for an epidemic
is zero, implying that a finite fraction of the graph be-
comes infected for arbitrarily low transmission probabil-
ities [6, 7, 8]. The presence of additional network struc-
ture was found to further influence the spread of disease
on scale-free graphs [9, 10, 11].
There are, however, differences between information
flows and the spread of viruses. While viruses tend to
be indiscriminate, infecting any susceptible individual,
information is selective and passed by its host only to
individuals the host thinks would be interested in it.
The information any individual is interested in depends
strongly on their characteristics. Furthermore, individu-
als with similar characteristics tend to associate with one
another, a phenomenon known as homophily [12, 13, 14].
Conversely, individuals many steps removed in a social
network on average tend not to have as much in com-
mon, as shown in a study [15] of a network of Stanford
student homepages and illustrated in Figure 1.
We therefore introduce an epidemic model with decay
in the transmission probability of a particular piece of in-
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FIG. 1: Average similarity of Stanford student homepages as
a function of the number of hyperlinks separating them.
formation as a function of the distance between the orig-
inating source and the current potential target. In the
following analysis, we show that this epidemic model on
a scale-free network has a finite threshold, implying that
the spread of information is limited. We further tested
our predictions by observing the prevalence of messages
in an organization and also by numerical experiments
that take into consideration the organizational distance
among individuals.
Consider the problem of information transmission in a
power-law network whose degree distribution is given by
[16]
pk = Ck
−α, (1)
where α > 1, and C is determined by the normalization
condition. The generating function of the distribution is
G0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
pkx
k =
Liα(x)
Liα(1)
. (2)
Following the analysis in [17] for the SIR (susceptible,
infected, removed) model, we now estimate the probabil-
ity p
(1)
m that the first person in the community who has
received a piece of information will transmit it to m of
2their neighbors. Using the binomial distribution, we find
p(1)m =
∞∑
k=m
pk
(
k
m
)
Tm(1− T )k−m, (3)
where the transmissiblity T is the probability that a per-
son will transmit an item to a neighbor and the super-
script “(1)” refers to first neighbors, those who received
the information directly from the initial source. The gen-
erating function for p
(1)
m is given by
G(1)(x) =
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
k=m
pk
(
k
m
)
Tm(1− T )k−mxm (4)
= G0(1 + (x − 1)T ) = G0(x;T ). (5)
Suppose the transmissibility decays as a power of the
distance from the initial source. We choose this weakest
form of decay as the results that are obtained from it
will also be valid for stronger functional forms. Then
the probability that an mth neighbor will transmit the
information to a person with whom he has contact is
given by
T (m) = (m+ 1)−βT, (6)
where β > 0 is the decay constant. T (m) = T at the
originating node (m = 0) and decays to zero as m→∞.
The distribution of the number of 2nd neighbors can
be written as
G(2)(x) =
∑
k
p
(1)
k [G
(1)
1 (x)]
k = G(1)(G
(1)
1 (x)), (7)
where
G
(1)
1 (x) = G1(x; 2
−βT ) = G1(1 + (x − 1)2
−βT ). (8)
Similarly, if we define G(m)(x) to be the the generating
function for the number of mth neighbors affected, then
we have
G(m+1)(x) = G(m)(G
(m)
1 (x)) for m ≥ 1, (9)
where
G
(m)
1 (x) = G1(x; (m+1)
−βT ) = G1(1+(x−1)(m+1)
−βT ),
(10)
and
G1(x) =
G′0(x)
G′0(1)
=
1
z
G′0(x). (11)
Or, more explicitly,
G(m+1)(x) = G(1)(G
(1)
1 (G
(2)
1 (· · ·G
(m)
1 (x)))). (12)
The average number zm+1 of (m+ 1)th neighbors is
zm+1 = G
(m+1)′(1) = G
(m)
1
′
(1)G(m)
′
(1) = G
(m)
1
′
(1)zm.
(13)
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FIG. 2: Tc as a function of α. The three different curves, from
bottom to top are: 1) no decay in transmission probability, no
exponential cutoff in the degree distribution (κ = ∞, β = 0).
2) κ = 100, β = 0, 3) κ = 100, β = 1.
So the condition that the size of the outbreak remains
finite is given by
zm+1
zm
= G
(m)
1
′
(1) < 1, (14)
or
(m+ 1)−βTG′1(1) < 1. (15)
For any given T , the left hand side of the inequality above
goes to zero when m→∞, so the condition is eventually
satisfied for large m. Therefore the average total size
〈s〉 =
∞∑
m=1
zm (16)
is always finite if the transmissibility decays with dis-
tance. Note that if T is constant the average total size is
infinite for values of α < 3 as shown previously.
In the real world however, the size of a network is
always finite, and in order to define a transmissibility
threshold one needs an outbreak size that is compati-
ble with the size of the whole network. Furthermore,
many real world networks have a cutoff κ far below
their size. Thus we can write for the link distribution
pk = Ck
−α exp(−k/κ).
As an example, consider a network made up of 106 ver-
tices. We define an epidemic to be an outbreak affecting
more than 1% or 104 vertices. Thus for fixed α, κ and β,
we can define Tc as the transmissibility above which 〈s〉
would be made to exceed 104.
The numerical result of Tc as a function of α is shown
in Fig. 2, where we choose κ = 100 and β = 1. It is
seen that when there is no decay, Tc is very near zero
for α close to 2, which means that for most values of
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FIG. 3: Number of people receiving URLs and attachments
T epidemics occur. However, when the transmissibility
decays, Tc rises substantially. For example, Tc jumps to
0.54 at α = 2, implying that the information may not
spread over the network.
In order to validate empirically that the spread of infor-
mation within a network of people is limited, and hence
distinct from the spread of a virus, we gathered a sam-
ple from the mail clients of 40 individuals (30 within HP
Labs, and 10 from other areas of HP, other research labs,
and universities). Each volunteer executed a program
that identified URLs and attachments in the messages
in their mailboxes, as well as they time the messages
were received. This data was cryptographically hashed
to protect the privacy of the users. By analyzing the
message content and headers, we restricted our data to
include only messages which had been forwarded at least
one time, thereby eliminating most postings to mailing
lists and more closely approximating true inter-personal
information spreading behavior. The median number of
messages in a mailbox in our sample is 2200, indicating
that many users keep a substantial portion of their email
correspondence. Although some messages may have been
lost when users deleted them, we assume that a major-
ity of messages containing useful information had been
retained.
Figure 3 shows a histogram of how many users had
received each of the 3401 attachments and 6370 URLs.
The distribution shows that only a small fraction (5% of
attachments and 10% of URLs) reach more than 1 re-
cipient. Very few (41 URLs and 6 attachments) reached
more than 5 individuals, a number which, in a sample of
40, starts to resemble an outbreak. In follow-up discus-
sions with our study subjects, we were able to identify
the content and significance of most of these messages.
14 of the URLs were advertisements attached to the bot-
tom of an email by free email services such as Yahoo and
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FIG. 4: Outdegree distribution for all senders (224,514 in
total) sending email to or from the HP Labs email server over
the course of 3 months. The outdegree of a node is the number
of correspondents the node sent email to.
MSN. These are in a sense viral, because the sender is
sending them involuntarily. It is this viral strategy that
was responsible for the rapid buildup of the Hotmail free
email service user base. 10 URLs pointed to internal HP
project or personal pages, 3 URLs were for external com-
mercial or personal sites, and the remaining 14 could not
be identified.
In our sample, one group is overrepresented, allowing
us to observe both the spread of information within a
close group, and the lack of information spread across
groups. A number of attachments reaching four or more
people were resumes circulated within one group. A few
attachments were announcements passed down by higher
level management. This kind of top down transmission
within an organization is another path through which
information can be efficiently disseminated.
Next we simulated the effect of decay in the transmis-
sion probability on the email graph at HP Labs in Palo
Alto, CA. The graph was constructed from recorded logs
of all incoming and outgoing messages over a period of
3 months. The graph has a nearly power-law out degree
distribution, shown in Figure 4, including both internal
and external nodes. Because all of the outgoing and in-
coming contacts were recorded for internal nodes, their in
and out degrees were higher than for the external nodes
for which we could only record the email they sent to and
received from HP Labs. We however considered a graph
with the internal and external nodes mixed (as in [18]) to
demonstrate the effect of a decay on the spread of email
specifically in a power-law graph.
We simulated the spread of an epidemic by selecting
a random initial sender to infect and following the email
log containing 120,000 entries involving over 7,000 recip-
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FIG. 5: Average outbreak and epidemic size as a function of
the transmission probability p.
ients in the course of a week. Every time an infective
individual was recorded as sending an email to someone
else, they had a constant probability p of infecting the
recipient. Hence individuals who email more often have
a higher probability of infecting. We also assume that an
individual remains infective (willing to transmit a partic-
ular piece of information) for a period of 24 hours.
Next we introduced a decay in the transmission prob-
ability p as p ∗ d−1.75ij , where dij is the distance in the
organizational hierarchy between two individuals. This
exponent roughly corresponds to the decay in similarity
between homepages shown in Figure 1. The decay rep-
resents the fact that individuals closer together in the
organizational hierarchy share more common interests.
Individuals have a distance of one to their immediate su-
periors and subordinates and to those they share a supe-
rior with. The distance between someone within HP labs
and someone outside of HP labs was set to the maximum
hierarchical distance of 8.
In figure 5 we show the variation in the average out-
break size, and the average epidemic size (chosen to be
any outbreak affecting more than 30 individuals). With-
out decay, the epidemic threshold falls below p = 0.01.
With decay, the threshold is set back to p = 0.20 and the
outbreak epidemic size is limited to about 50 individuals,
even for p = 1.
As these results show, the decay of similarity among
members of a social group has strong implications for the
propagation of information among them. In particular,
the number of individuals that a given email message
reaches is very small, in contrast to what one would ex-
pect on the basis of a virus epidemic model on a scale free
graph. The implication of this finding is that merely dis-
covering hubs in a community network is not enough to
ensure that information originating at a particular node
will reach a large fraction of the community. We expect
that these findings are also valid with other means of so-
cial communication, such as verbal exchanges, telephony
and instant messenger systems.
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